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Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of different forms of inflation targeting (IT)
in the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT). To this end, we first estimate the
ERPT for a large sample of countries using state-space models. We then con-
sider the adoption of an inflation targeting framework by a country as a treat-
ment to find suitable counterfactuals to the actual targeters. By controlling for
self-selection bias and endogeneity of the monetary policy regime, we confirm
that the ERPT tends to be lower for countries adopting explicit IT. However,
we uncover that older regimes, adopting a range or point with tolerance band
and keeping inflation close to the target, outperform other IT regimes. We
also show that IT is effective even with a relatively high inflation target or low
central bank independence.
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1 Introduction
It is well documented that exchange rate variations are less than completely associ-
ated with changes in prices in recent times. The most common interpretation for this
finding is that improvements in monetary policy performance - reflected in stronger
nominal anchors and low, stable inflation - result in an endogenous reduction in the
exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices.1 Moreover, the adoption of inflation
targeting (IT) is often associated with this stability.
Indeed, it is argued that in the context of a stable and predictable monetary
policy environment, nominal shocks –such as exchange rate shocks– play a vastly
reduced role in driving fluctuations in prices (Taylor (2000)). Thus, improvements
in monetary policy performance–reflected in stronger nominal anchors and low, sta-
ble inflation–result in an endogenous reduction in the exchange rate pass-through to
consumer prices: when the inflation environment is more stable, firms resist passing
exchange rate changes on to prices.2 Similar arguments are developed in Gagnon
and Ihrig (2004), Bailliu and Fujii (2004), Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004),
Ihrig, Marazzi, and Rothenberg (2006), Marazzi and Sheets (2007), Bouakez and
Rebei (2008), Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Dong (2012) where the size of pass-
through is a function of the stance of monetary policy.
Following this strand of the literature, many studies provide evidence that the
adoption of an inflation targeting framework is associated with an improvement
in overall economic performance (Bernanke and Mishkin (1997); Svensson (1997)).
For instance, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) suggest that exchange rate pass-
through (ERPT) seems to be attenuated by the adoption of IT. The basic underlying
idea is that adopting IT leads to credibility gains that are responsible for keeping
low inflation expectations following an exchange rate appreciation. Consequently,
opting for an inflation targeting framework is a means to reduce ERPT since under
this regime, (i) inflation is expected to be diminished and stabilized, and (ii) central
banks are expected to gain credibility as inflation-fighters. In addition, as shown
by Reyes (2007), under inflation targeting regime, central banks respond to an ex-
change rate appreciation by increasing the interest rate to impede that exchange
rate changes feed into inflation.
Most of the previous literature on ERPT and its link with inflation targeting,
however, misses some key elements: self selection bias, endogeneity and hetero-
geneity of the inflation target regime. In the first case, selection bias occurs when
1See, for instance, Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Campa and Goldberg (2005).
2In other words, if the increase in costs following a depreciation is perceived as transitory, agents
can reduce temporarily their markups, save the menu costs of changing prices and simply wait until
the shock reverts. On the contrary, if the shock is perceived as permanent or highly persistent, the
price adjustment is inevitable. Since the economy will be subject to more persistent nominal shocks
in high inflation regimes, the link between the level of inflation and the pass-through emerges.
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IT is not randomly allocated across countries, but is instead correlated with other
variables. A difference in ERPT between countries faced with IT (the so-called
treated group) and the other countries (the so-called control group) could then be
attributable to systematic differences in some variables between the treated and
control groups rather than the effect of the treatment itself (IT adoption). In the
second case, the adoption of inflation targeting is clearly an endogenous choice (see
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001)). For instance, countries with histories of high
inflation or expecting future high inflation are more likely to have felt compelled to
adopt an inflation targeting framework. The finding that lower ERPT is associated
with inflation targeting thus may not imply that inflation targeting causes ERPT.
Finally, note that this literature provides no evidence as to which of the different
forms and institutional arrangements of IT is more effective at reducing the ERPT.
The objective of this paper is to establish whether and how inflation targeting
alter the way exchange rate changes impact prices. We contribute to the litera-
ture in different aspects. First, we use the Kalman filter to estimate the ERPT.
By doing so, we allow this parameter to vary without imposing assumptions about
whether or how it varies. Second, we pay special attention to self selection bias and
endogeneity with regard to the monetary policy regime by relying on a methodol-
ogy that allows us to determine whether a treatment leads to different outcomes
than the absence of treatment. To this end, we match treated observations with
control observations that share similar characteristics other than the presence of the
treatment. That is, we construct a counterfactual for the treatment, based on a
set of observable characteristics. This is particularly important since while a large
part of the literature proposes that explicit IT regimes are generally associated with
higher macroeconomic performance (Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004); Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007)), other studies suggest that there is no evidence that
performance is attributable to IT (see Ball and Sheridan (2003); Lin and Ye (2007)
or Angeriz and Arestis (2008)).3 Third, as the benefits of explicitly adopting an IT
regime are still an open debate in the literature, our main contribution is to ana-
lyze, in detail, the effectiveness of the IT regime under different circumstances. In
particular, we alter our original sample by dropping one at a time from the whole
sample IT countries that present different characteristics in terms of the monetary
regime. Therefore we first distinguish countries regarding their initial level of in-
flation. Second, from the original sample, we distinguish observations according to
the inflation targeted level. Third, from all IT and Non IT observations, we use
different treatments regarding the deviations of actual inflation to the announced
target. Fourth, we differentiate by the durability of the regime. Fifth, we formed the
treatment with respect to the independence of the central bank. Sixth, observations
3Some literature on propensity scores to assess the effect of inflation targeting on inflation
or exchange rate volatility can be found in Lin and Ye (2009), Lin (2010), de Mendonca and
de Guimar̈ı¿ 1
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es e Souza (2012), Samarina, Terpstra, and Haan (2014) or Yamada (2013). However,
to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one to use this technique for evaluating ERPT.
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were differentiated between point or band target. By performing this exercise, we
try to shed light into the mechanisms through which IT lowers the ERPT.
Since the ERPT is not an observable variable, our empirical assessment relies
on a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate time-varying coefficients
of exchange rate pass through for each economy by means of state space models.
In the second step, we explore whether these estimates are related to our proxies of
monetary policy objective using a propensity score matching (PSM) methodology.
We estimate different models and use several alternative definitions in order to en-
sure the robustness of our findings.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, IT significantly reduces the
ERPT. Second, this benefit is robust to different structural characteristics. Third,
we reveal some important heterogeneities among IT countries. In particular, older
regimes outperform newer regimes. Also, allowing for a band or range target is found
to be more efficient than a single point targeting regime. Finally, keeping inflation
relatively close to the objective, even if this objective is higher than 2 percent, makes
a difference for achieving lower pass through.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail our
methodology. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 displays our estimation results,
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Methodology
The main objective of this paper is to assess whether inflation targeters differ from
non-targeters in the response of inflation to shocks in the exchange rate. To this
end, we first estimate the ERPT. Instead of using the traditional rolling ERPT
estimates, we rely in state space models that allow us to estimate the coefficients
for each period of the sample employed in this paper. We then test for differences
between targeters and non targeters by adopting a PSM methodology.
2.1 Estimating time-varying ERPT by state space models
The degree of exchange rate pass-through is not directly observable and therefore
needs to be estimated before its hypothetical link with a monetary target can be
tested. Following Kim (1990) and Sekine (2006), we estimate a varying-parameter
model for quarterly data of the pass-through based on the following generic specifi-
cation proposed by Goldberg and Knetter (1997):
∆pt = α+
4∑
j=1
γj∆pt−j + θt∆et + ρ∆yt + λ∆p
∗
t +Gεt (1)
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where pt denotes consumer prices in period t, et is the nominal effective exchange
rate, yt is the demand shifter (domestic GDP growth), p
∗
t corresponds to a supply
shock variable (average OECD producer price index) and εt ∼ N(0, Gt) is an inde-
pendent and identically distributed error term. We include 4 lags of the inflation
rate to better capture the observed inertial behavior of inflation (inflation persis-
tence), to avoid autocorrelation of the residuals and to avoid underestimating the
ERPT. All the variables are expressed in logarithms.4
Following Campa and Goldberg (2005) or Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon
(2010), among others, we also estimate the following pass-through equation:
∆pt = α+
4∑
j=1
γj∆pt−j +
4∑
j=0
θj,t∆et−j + ρ∆yt + λ∆p
∗
t +Gεt (2)
In Eq. (2), the statistic of interest is the sum of the coefficients on the nominal
exchange rate: θt(n) =
∑4
j=1 θj,t. These coefficients reflect the impact that the cur-
rent change in the exchange rate has on the consumer price over time. Therefore,
the estimations of Equations (1) and (2) yield short-run (one quarter) and long-run
(four quarters) pass-through elasticities, respectively.
Note that, in Equations (1) and (2), the ERPT coefficient, θ, is assumed to
be time-varying. We obtain these coefficients by expanding the previous equation,
known as the the measurement equation, with the following ERPT shift equation:
θt = θt−1 + Cυt (3)
where the ERPT parameter θ depends on an autoregressive term and υt ∼
N(0, Qt). The system (1)-(3) constitute a state-space model. These type of models
can be estimated using the Kalman filter recursive algorithm, which is commonly
employed in time-varying coefficient models. The Kalman filter is a method for re-
cursively obtaining linear, least-squares forecasts of unknown coefficients conditional
on past information. These forecasts are used then to construct the log likelihood.
More precisely, for each time t, the Kalman filter produces the conditional expected
state vector θt|t−1 and the conditional covariance matrix Ωt|t−1; both are conditional
on information up to and including time t. Using the model and previous period
results, for each t we begin with:
4Note that the ERPT equation is specified in first differences because the underlying series are
generally found to be integrated of order one and non-cointegrated (see, e.g., Campa and Goldberg
(2005)).
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θt|t−1 = θt−1|t−1
Ωt|t−1 = Ωt−1|t−1 + CQC
′
∆pt|t−1 = α+ γ
n∑
j=1
∆pt−j + θt|t−1∆et + λ∆p
∗
t + ρ∆yt +Gεt (4)
The residuals and the mean squared error (MSE) matrix of the forecast error
are:
ν̂t|t = ∆pt −∆pt|t−1
Σt|t = y
∗
t Ωt−1|t−1(∆et)
′ +GQG′ (5)
In the last step, we update the conditional expected state vector and the condi-
tional covariance with the information in time t:
θt|t−1 = θt−1|t−1 + Ωt|t−1(∆e)Σ
−1
t|t ν̂t|t
Ωt|t = Ωt|t−1 − Ωt|t(∆e)Σ−1t|t (∆e)
′Ωt|t−1 (6)
Equations (4) to (6) are the Kalman filter. The equations denoted by (4) are the
one-step predictions. These predictions do not use contemporaneous values of ∆pt;
only its past values. Equations (5) and (6) form the update step of the Kalman fil-
ter; they incorporate the contemporaneous dependent variable information into the
predicted states. In addition, the Kalman filter requires initial values for the states
and a covariance matrix for the initial states to start off the recursive process.5 The
previous system of equations can then be estimated by maximum likelihood.
2.2 Assessing the effects of a target with propensity score matching
In order to determine whether countries that have adopted IT present a lower level
of ERPT than countries that have not, we must properly control for endogeneity and
self selection bias since IT countries may also have lower inflation and pass through
rates for other reasons than the adoption of IT. Then, a challenge in evaluating the
benefits of IT is to disentangle the direction of causality. Indeed, it could be argued
that if IT improves the credibility of monetary policy and the anchoring of infla-
tion expectations, then there would be less of a pass-through effect from exchange
rate shocks. As a result of increased credibility and reduced pass-through, inflation
targeting may also reinforce monetary policy independence (Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2007)).
5OLS estimates can be used as initial values.
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There are a number of ways to account for endogeneity or self-selection bias.
The first and more obvious approach is to use an instrument for being a targeter.6
This standard approach to rely on an instrumental variable that affects the target
but does not directly affect inflation is criticized for several reasons. For instance,
controlling for the differences across countries through an effective instrument is
quite difficult, especially in the presence of limited amount of data. A second,
less standard approach,7 would be to employ the matching and propensity score
methodology that was developed precisely for the bias associated with this type of
estimation problem. In this paper, we follow this approach and apply the matching
methodology to account for the possible estimation bias. As far as we know, this
way of proceeding is novel for studying the ERPT and its link with monetary policy.
The idea behind the PSM approach is to determine whether a treatment (in
our case the policy goal) leads to different outcomes relative to an absence of the
treatment, i.e. by matching treated observations with control observations that
share similar characteristics other than the presence of the treatment. Following
the matching of observations, we assess the “treatment effect” by measuring the
difference in the ERPT between the two groups. That is, we see IT adoption as
a “natural experiment,” so we seek to reestablish the conditions of a randomized
experiment where the IT adoption mimics a treatment.
More in detail, let D be a binary indicator that equals one if a country has
adopted IT, zero otherwise. Also, let Y 1i denote the ERPT for country i if the
country has adopted IT (i.e. if the country is in the treated group) and Y 0i if not, all
other characteristics of the country being equal. The treatment effect for country i
can be written as Y 1i − Y 0i , where one outcome is observed and the other one is the
counterfactual. We are interested in estimating the average treatment (ATT) effect
on the treated countries, that is:
ATT = E[Y 1i |D = 1]− E[Y 0i |D = 1] (7)
6Some instruments for IT used in the literature are: i) being an English speaking country and
the interaction between this and having high inflation. This identification approach assumes that
sharing a common language means that the central bank and government were more likely to be
influenced by the same theories about how to effectively fight inflation, ii) a measure of central
bank independence since it is argued that central banks that had less historical independence have
greater need to become inflation targeters. This implies that they would be vigilant in fighting
inflation (Boschen and Weise (2003)) and, iii) benefit entitlements during the 1980s with the idea
that higher unemployment benefits may mean the central bank is less concerned about the costs
of unemployment and hence focuses more on reducing inflation (MacCulloch, Tella, and Oswald
(2001)).
7Among the non-standard approaches, it has recently been proposed to study inflation targeting
with experimental economics methods, in order to be able to control the factors affecting the results
of monetary policy. This is for example the case of Cornand and M’Baye (2018), who applied these
methods to the choice of communicating a target by the central bank.
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Introducing the control group, we can write the average treatment as:
ATT = E[Y 1i |D = 1]− E[Y 0i |D = 0]− E[Y 0i |D = 1] + E[Y 0i |D = 0] (8)
where E[Y 1i |D = 1] and E[Y 0i |D = 0] are observed and E[Y 0i |D = 0]−E[Y 0i |D = 1]
is the selection bias. Hence, Eq.(8) can only be identified if this selection bias dis-
appears, i.e. if E[Y 0i |D = 1] = E[Y 0i |D = 0].
The PSM methodology deals with this selection problem by pairing each treated
observation with control observations that are otherwise similar based on a set of
observable characteristics, X. This requires that the treatment satisfies some form
of exogeneity, namely the so-called conditional independence assumption. This as-
sumption states that, conditional on a vector of observable characteristics, the vari-
able of interest (the ERPT) is independent of the treatment status. Conditional on
this vector X, the expected ERPT in the absence of IT would then be the same
for paired countries, that is E[Y 0i |D = 1,X] = E[Y 0i |D = 0,X], and the bias would
disappear. Under this assumption then ATT effect is written as:
ATT = E[Y 1i |D = 1,X]− E[Y 0i |D = 0,X] (9)
In Eq. (9) E[Y 1i |D = 1,X] controls for the relevant set of characteristics, X. This
set should include variables that are co-determinants of both IT (the treatment) and
ERPT (the outcome), and conditioning on all relevant variables may be a challenge.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Imbens (2004) show that if the hypothesis of
conditional independence hold then all biases due to observable components can be
removed by conditioning on the propensity score. Therefore, ATT becomes:
ATT = E[Y 1i |D = 1, p(X)]− E(Y 0i |D = 0, p(X)] (10)
where E[Y 1i |D = 1, p(X)] denotes the fact that we control for the probability of
observing the treatment conditional on the set X of variables. p(X), the propensity
score, should reflect a compromise between the potential influence of a variable on
the outcome and its ability to improve the matching.
To obtain ATT, we proceed in two steps. We first estimate the propensity score
by a benchmark probit equation explaining the likelihood of a country receiving the
treatment. To this end, we consider a number of potential structural, political, and
economic determinants of IT (or any other treatment).8 We then use a matching
algorithm to pair the observations based on observable characteristics. We employ
four matching algorithms: nearest neighbor, kernel, local linear, and radius match-
ing. These different approaches all match observations with similar characteristics,
differentiating one group of countries which adopt IT (the “treatment group”) and
8As a robustness exercises we also estimate logit models for the benchmark equation.
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the other group that does not (the “control group”).9
Applying these matching methods requires that two hypotheses must be satisfied.
The first is the conditional independence assumption stating that, conditional to
the vector of observable variables X, the outcome variable is independent of the IT
adoption. The second is the common support condition, which ensures that there is
sufficient overlap in the characteristics of the treated and untreated groups to find
adequate matches.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We consider a sample of 48 advanced and emerging economies that have and have
not adopted explicit IT between 1982 and 2016: Argentina, Australia*, Austria, Bel-
gium, Brazil*,Canada*, Chile*, Colombia*, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland*, France,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, China, Hungary*, India, Indonesia*, Ireland, Israel*,
Italy, Japan, Korea*, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico*, Netherlands, New Zealand*, Nor-
way*, Peru*, Philippines*, Poland*, Portugal, Romania*, Russia, Singapore, Slo-
vak Republic*, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Thailand*,
Turkey*, The United Kingdom* and The United States.10
Following Rose (2007), Minea and Tapsoba (2014) and Balima, Combes, and
Minea (2017) we classify an observation as IT distinguishing between Full-fledge
(FF henceforth) and Soft starting dates of IT. The difference between the two dates
captures the fact that some central banks first adopted “soft or informal” IT (see
Vega and Winkelried (2005)), in which the central bank’s reaction, following a devi-
ation of inflation from its targeted level, is slower compared to its reaction under an
explicit “full-fledged or formal” IT. Consequently, soft IT are those dates declared
by central banks themselves, while full-fledged IT starting dates are those consid-
ered the dates from which the central bank began meeting the required criteria to be
classified as an ITer. Under these two classifications for our sample of 48 countries,
24 countries are IT by the end of the period.
However, given that any classification into inflation targeters is somewhat sub-
jective, we also used a “Flawed” IT classification. This category includes all the
countries present in “soft” and “full-fledged IT list”, as well as three countries for
9The nearest-neighbor pairs each observation in the treatment group with the closest observation
(in term of propensity score) from the control group. We consider the nearest (N=1) and the five-
nearest neighbors (N=5). The radius method (see Dehejia and Wahba (2002)) matches each treated
with untreated located at some distance. We use a wide (r=0.05) radius. Finally, the kernel and
local-linear method compare the outcome of each treated observation to a weighted average of the
outcomes of all control observations, with the highest weight being placed on the control observations
with the closest propensity scores to the treated observation (see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
(1998)).
10ITers are denoted with a star, *. Note that the sample size might occasionally change.
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which there is no consensus in the literature: Japan, India and the United States.
Indeed, almost all the studies devoted to IT exclude these three countries, including
recent studies such as Ardakania, Kishorb, and Song (2018) or Ilzetzki, Reinhart,
and Rogoff (Forthcoming). The main argument used not to consider these coun-
tries as ITers comes from the importance given to price stability. According to the
IT definition by Mishkin (2004) or Hammond (2012): “price stability is effectively
recognized as the main goal of monetary policy”. In the US, the Fed has a dual
mandate which gives a strong weight to the maximum sustainable employment ob-
jective, while in Japan the BoJ announced an inflation target, but, according to
many commentators, focuses mostly on the exchange rate. This definition is called
into question by other works. For instance, Bundick and Smith (2018) show that the
structure of inflation expectations in the US has changed since the announcement
of an inflation target in January 2012. In Japan, the announcement of a quantified
target of inflation (2%) was one of the goals of the Abenomics in 2013. Papers such
as ichi Fukuda and Soma (2019) or Okimoto (2019) show that this announcement
has had a significant effect on inflation expectations and on inflation trend, meaning
that IT adoption has a strong impact on the Japanese economy. The case of India
is different. Indeed, since this country adopted inflation targeting in 2016 the only
reason that other studies do not include India in the IT group is that this is a recent
event.11 To take into account the lack of consensus on these three countries, we
present the three definitions.
We use a dummy variable IT that takes the value 1 for countries that adopted
an inflation targeting framework and 0 otherwise.12 Dates of adoption for each of
the three classifications are presented in Table (9) in the Appendix.
The variables entering the estimation of the exchange rate pass through are: (i)
the consumer price index (P ), (ii) the nominal effective exchange rate defined as
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency (E, source BIS), (iii) the GDP (Y ,
source IFS), and (iv) the OECD producer price index as a proxy for supply factors
(P ∗, source OECD).13 All the series are seasonally adjusted. We work with the
year-to-year differences of the variables expressed in logarithm terms.
For the second step, namely, the PSM estimation, we work with annual data
in order to consider a broad set of variables that define an economy. We therefore
annualised the ERPT found in the first step by taking the annual mean value of the
four quarters.
11On India, see for example Mohan and Ray (2019) and Ito (2019).
12In other words, the dummy variable takes on the value one starting in the period in which the
country adopted this inflation target (and for all subsequent years), and zero otherwise.
13An increase in the nominal exchange rate implies a depreciation. Therefore, a positive relation-
ship is expected between exchange rate changes and inflation, since a depreciation of the currency
should be followed by an increase in inflation.
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Now, one of the basic underlying principles to adopt IT is to gain credibility and
to keep low inflation expectations following an exchange rate appreciation. However,
IT can have different characteristics that could, in principle, lead to heterogeneity
in the effectiveness of IT. Therefore, it seems beneficial to also evaluate whether
the success of IT holds when changing the composition of the treatment group. In
particular, we exclude from the treatment group countries according to:
• Level of inflation: An expanding body of arguments hold that ERPT is
higher in a high and unstable inflation environment. On the contrary, when the
inflation environment is more stable, expectations of inflation become firmly
anchored which may explain why firms resist passing exchange rate changes
on to prices. We therefore alter our benchmark treatment sample by dropping
countries that have more than 3, 5, 10 and 15 percent inflation;
• Targeted inflation rate: With the objective of keeping longer-term inflation
expectations firmly anchored, most central banks now target an inflation rate
of 2 per cent. However, the recent experience with the effective lower bound on
nominal interest rates has renewed interest in the benefits of inflation targets
above 2 per cent. We evaluate whether an increase in the inflation target would
be detrimental to achieving low ERPT by choosing from the original sample
different treatments according to the announced target (see Ngo (2018));
• Deviations of actual inflation from its target: we are interested not
only on the effects of having formally adopted an inflation target, but also in
the effects of having successfully hit the declared target. Indeed, according to
Bordo and Siklos (2015), credibility is crucially dependent on the relationship
between observed and some estimate of the inflation rate that the central
bank targets, either a numerical announcement objective or a a pre-specified
target range. Following this argument, we finally alter the original sample by
excluding observations that deviate more or less from the target.
• Regime duration: It is suggested that older regimes are more likely to deliver
better outcomes than newer regimes (Mihov and Rose (2007)). The main
argument is that monetary policy could work with lags in building credibility.
To explore this possibility, we first exclude from the whole sample IT countries
with more than 3 years under IT and then countries with less than 5 years;
• Central Bank Independence: analogous to the previous point, it could
be argued that a monetary policy environment which is supported by an in-
stitutional framework that allows the central bank to pursue a credible and
independent policy contributes to explain why even sizeable depreciations of
the nominal exchange rate exert small effects on prices. To test this hypoth-
esis, we abstract from countries with higher independence of the central bank
with respect to the median of the sample. The idea in this case is to identify if
11
an independent authority is necessary to achieve a better outcome for IT coun-
tries. We used Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) CBI indicator, coded
by Crowe and Meade (2007), Bodea and Hicks (2015) and Garriga (2016b);
• Band, range or point inflation targeting: The debate related to band
versus point IT focuses on the advantages and drawbacks of each regime.
The main argument in favor of the adoption of a band IT regime is that
the band can signal to the public that the central bank may fail to achieve its
numerical objective in a context of uncertainty. The higher the uncertainty
on inflation expectations, the wider the band must be to avoid too large a
deviation of inflation from the target (see Peter, Roger, and Heenan (2006) or
Hammond (2012)). Range targets are also believed to better communicate the
uncertainly and, therefore, the realism of the inflation forecast and economic
fundamentals (Mishkin and Westelius (2008)). Point targets, in turn, are
defended because they are supposed to better anchor inflation expectations and
hence, reducing the costs associated with imperfect knowledge which can lead
to higher macroeconomic performance (e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2007)).
In this case, we exclude from the treatment group observations that allow for
a range target or point target band and then observations with strict point
inflation target. The sources come from various central bank publications;
The rest of the variables correspond to the controls that we use in the logit or
probit estimations for the propensity score for inflation targeting: inflation volatility,
financial development, political stability, the number of countries having adopted IT,
the share of world GDP and trade openness. Appendix A summarizes the definition
and source of all the variables.
4 Results
4.1 The time-varying ERPT estimates
Figures 1 and 2 show the estimated ERPT varying coefficients. It has to be added so
that the varying-parameter estimation techniques based on the Kalman filter may
be uncertain in some cases. However, being an unobservable variable, this is the
case for almost any ERPT coefficient in the empirical literature. Alternatively to
the Kalman filter, to capture the decline in exchange rate pass-through, most of the
research is done by splitting the sample or by rolling regressions. However, as sug-
gested by Sekine (2006), these estimation techniques are based on the assumption
that underlying parameters are not altered within the estimated sample periods,
and thus they do not necessarily provide precise parameter shifts. Moreover, it is
often the case with rolling regressions that the timing of parameter shifts crucially
depends on the size of windows. We therefore compared our state-space ERPT es-
12
timates with those obtained by rolling regressions.14 In general, both estimation
methods provide coefficients that follow a similar path. However, the state-space
results suggest that the changing nature in pass-through is more gradual compared
with those obtained by rolling regressions. We believe in gradual changes in pass-
through for at least two reasons: First, rolling regressions tend to yield different
coefficients depending on whether or not a specific sample is in the window. Second,
the time-varying parameter model tends to yield gradual changes in the pass-through
because of smoothing. As suggested by Sims (2001), it is smoothed series that give
a more precise estimate of actual time variation.
Therefore, even though there are concerns about the limitations of the Kalman
filter, our estimates provide some similarities with alternative techniques and previ-
ous research in several points: i) there is substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude
of the estimated exchange rate pass-through across countries, ii) the ERPT is incom-
plete in all the cases, the mean value being 0.24 for the whole sample, iii) the figures
also shows that it declines over time in various countries. However, the decreasing
ERPT found in the literature is not a generalized feature for our set of countries,
iv) emerging economies have, in general, higher ERPT than advanced countries and
v) ERPT is not constant over time.15
4.2 The Propensity Score for Inflation Targeting
Once the ERPT is calculated, it remains unclear whether there is a link with the
monetary policy goal. As a first step to produce the propensity score specifica-
tions for IT, we estimate the probability of observing Full Fledge IT for all the
countries of our sample. We therefore explore economic, fiscal, external, financial,
and institutional characteristics highlighted by the literature as preconditions for IT
adoption.16 Table 1 presents the logit estimations considering different control vari-
ables.17 We also estimate the propensity score for our two alternative definitions:
Soft and Flawed IT. Changing the dates and the composition of the sample does
not alter the results.18
As seen, the variables help in capturing the specificities of the treatment since all
estimated parameters are significant. Indeed, contrary to our intuition, the results
14All the values are available upon request to the authors.
15Table C in the appendix provides the mean value of the ERPT obtained by the state-space
model. For comparison purposes, we also present the results from OLS regressions.
16It is worth noting that when estimating the propensity score, our goal is not only to find the best
statistical model to explain the probability of IT adoption but also to achieve the best matching.
Indeed, to respect the conditional independence assumption, the propensity score estimates should
include all the possible variables that may have a systematic impact on the ERPT as well as on
choice of monetary policy goals.
17All variables used in the logit regression are lagged in order to ensure that they are not affected
by the treatment.
18All the results are available under request to the authors.
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Table 1: Propensity score for inflation targeting. Independent variable: IT dummy
Baseline Baseline Adding Adding Adding
Model Model Structure Financial Fiscal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent var. FF IT Soft IT FF IT FF IT FF IT
Inflation vol. -0.21** -0.18** -0.24** -0.32*** -0.14
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Market Dev. 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Political stability 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.29*** 0.16*** 0.23***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
IT number 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP Share -3.67*** -3.77*** -2.80*** -2.18*** -2.49***
(0.48) (0.47) (0.52) (0.36) (0.50)
Trade openness -1.51*** -1.54*** -1.25*** -0.59*** -1.39***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20)
Econ. Development -0.07**
(0.04)
Energy dependence -0.05***
(0.02)
Remittances 0.17**
(0.07)
Income -0.00***
(0.00)
Credit 0.01***
(0.00)
Broad money -0.04***
(0.00)
Debt to GDP -0.03***
(0.00)
Fiscal deficit 0.03
(0.02)
Constant 3.19*** 3.51*** 2.65** 0.29 2.93***
(0.93) (0.90) (1.19) (0.99) (1.03)
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.28
N. of Obs. 1015 1015 799 981 914
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance at the 1 5 and 10%, respectively. “FF” denotes full fledged
inflation targeting. Soft and full fledged are defined as in Minea and Tapsoba (2014).
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indicate that high inflation volatility decreases the likelihood to adopt inflation tar-
geting.19 This result is in line with studies by Lucotte (2012), Minea and Tapsoba
(2014), Ebeke and Fouejieu (2015) and Balima, Combes, and Minea (2017) among
others, who show that high or volatile inflation is negatively associated with the
probability of adopting IT. GDP share and trade openness is also found to nega-
tively affect IT adoption. In the first case, note that small countries are more likely
to fix because they have a higher propensity to trade internationally and are less
likely to trade using the nation unit of account, while the major currencies (the US
dollar, the Euro and the Yen) are not ITers.20 The usual explanation behind the
negative sign in the case of trade openness is that many economies are dependent
on foreign trade and exposed to real external shocks. As such, countries tend to
limit exchange rate movements. Consequently, open economies often prefer to have
exchange rate pegs rather than inflation targeting with flexible exchange rates (see,
for instance Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007)). On the contrary, political stability,
captured by the democracy score, market or financial development and the number
of countries with IT increases the probability of targeting inflation. 21
We next proceed to verify that the independence condition holds, i.e., that the
value of the various control variables does not significantly differ between the treat-
ment and control groups once the matching is computed. Results, using different
matching algorithms, indicate that no significant difference remains in the data after
any of the matching procedures for the benchmark and the majority of alternative
models. Details on the validation procedure are presented in Appendix D.
4.3 ERPT and Inflation Targeting
Having proved that all the prerequisites of our method hold, we estimate the impact
of the monetary regime on the ERPT. In order to do so, we perform the matches
and estimate the average treatment effects –IT– on the treated countries.
Let us first focus on the estimated average effect of FF IT. As seen in Table 2,
the results show that IT significantly decreases the ERPT in ITers compared to the
control group (i.e. non ITers). Indeed, depending on the matching algorithm and
the control variables considered, the reduction is estimated to lie between 0.12 and
0.17 percentage points.
19It has been argued that economies with high prior inflation are more likely to adopt IT (Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Goncalves and Salles (2008)). We should expect then high and
unstable inflation to be a prerequisite for IT (i.e. a positive sign of inflation volatility in the probit
model). However, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Mishkin (2000) also highlight that
industrial countries and some emerging country inflation targeters started IT at initial inflation
close to stationary low levels.
20On the relation between country size and monetary regime choice, see also Levy Yeyati,
Sturzenegger, and Reggio (2010) and Rose (2014).
21We add a set of variables that may affect IT adoption as long as we do not reduce too much
the number of treated observations (see columns (4), (5) and (6) in Table (1))
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It is important to remark that many countries, particularly emerging ones,
adopted initially partial IT, shifting only later, and often quite gradually, to full-
fledged IT. Therefore, analogous to our previous analysis, we estimate the average
treatment effect for the Soft classification adoption date. Results are also presented
in Table 2. As seen, under this criteria, countries with IT also present a significant
lower ERPT compared to the control group.22 Moreover, Table 2 also shows that
our results are robust to changes in the PS definition: in addition to the baseline
variables, we add variables related to the structure of the economy, the financial
sector or the fiscal position of the country while computing the PS index. The esti-
mated ATT based on these additional variables is negative, significant and of similar
to the baseline estimation.
4.4 The heterogenous effectiveness of Inflation Targeting
Our analysis confirms previous results regarding the effectiveness of IT to reduce
the link between inflation and exchange rate shocks, even after controlling for endo-
geneity and self-selection bias. We now investigate if the effectiveness of IT holds to
different characteristics of the regime.
First, we account for the inflation level. Indeed, the ERPT should be lower in
a more stable inflation environment. In addition, many ITers used IT initially as a
price stabilization device, adopting the new regime at initially moderate and even
high inflation levels and pre-announcing a sequence of annually declining inflation
targets. By dropping observations according to different actual inflation levels, Table
3 shows that IT adoption statistically affect the pass-through at any level of inflation.
Second, the good performance of IT seems to be more related to keeping inflation
close to the target than to the target rate itself. Indeed, Table 8 shows the ATT
when we exclude observations according to the targeted inflation rate. As seen, the
ERPT is significantly lower for countries targeting different inflation rates than for
non ITers. In other words, the results show that countries which adopt IT manage
to reduce the ERPT, even when the targeted inflation rate is higher than 2 per-
cent. This result shows that there is not difference, at least in terms of reducing the
impact of exchange rate shocks on inflation, between a target of 2% and a higher
target. Indeed, many central banks target an inflation rate near two percent. How-
ever, some economists claim that a four percent target would ease the constraints
on monetary policy arising from the zero bound on interest rates, with the result
that economic downturns would be less severe (See, for instance, Ball (2014)). Our
results when the treatment is target at least 4% of inflation show that a four percent
22For the sake of completeness we also alter our IT sample by considering Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and
Rogoff (2017) list of IT countries. This list is almost the same as IT FF but it excludes Switzerland
and differs on some starting dates. The estimated ATT for this alternative IT definition was similar
to the estimated ATT for IT FF.
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inflation does not imply a significantly higher ERPT than a two percent. However,
note that IT is extremely effective when the authorities achieve an inflation level
close to their target. This positive effect, however, stabilizes for large deviations
from the objective, becoming comparable to the ATT in our baseline specification
(see Table 5).
Table 6 shows the results when we exclude observations according to the dura-
tion of the regime, i.e. our treatment groups become observations of countries that
will adopt IT in less than three years, that have adopted IT for less than 3 years
and more than 3 and 5 years.23 As seen, ATTs are not significant in the estimation
for countries that will adopt IT in the near future or countries with less than 3
years with IT. That is, there is no significant difference between IT during the first
years of adoption compared to countries without IT. On the contrary, estimated
ATTs are stronger –and even by roughly 0.1 pp– in older regimes compared to the
benchmark case. Such differences unveil that the length of exposure to IT is an im-
portant determinant of the success to reduce the ERPT. In accordance with Mihov
and Rose (2007), since no inflation targeter has been forced to leave its IT under
duress, we can affirm that this result is not driven by having only “good performers”.
We now look at central bank independence. Using the median level of three
alternative indicators based on Crowe and Meade (2007), Bodea and Hicks (2015)
and Garriga (2016b), we exclude from the treatment group observations with high
levels of independence. Table 7 reveals that IT adoption reduces the ERPT even for
observations with independence of the central bank lower than the median, the dif-
ference respect to non ITers being significant at conventional levels. In other words,
countries with more independent central banks do not outperform other ITers in
terms of lower ERPT.
Finally, trying to contribute to the debate regarding the benefits of limits of
uncertainly that the central bank transmits to the public, we alter our sample by
dropping first i) only observations that allow for a band or range and then ii) only
observations with a strict point target, from the treatment group. Table 8 shows
that IT adoption significantly reduces the ERPT when the central bank allows for
uncertainty regarding the target. In fact, note that the difference between IT with
point target and not IT is not significant in the estimated ATT. Thus, if IT adop-
tion reduces the link between exchange rate shocks and inflation, a more “flexible”
target outperforms any other objective. This result suggests that more discretion
within the IT framework is not detriment to reduce exchange rate shocks on prices.24
23By defining a treatment group with countries that will adopt IT during the following 3 years we
consider that some inflation targeters were targeting inflation before the announcement of official
targets.
24Given that in some cases, the number of observations in each regime is small and, therefore, the
results should be taken with precaution, we estimated Equation (1) with different interaction vari-
ables by dynamic GMM for robustness purposes. The results confirm our finding using propensity
17
score matching techniques.
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5 Conclusions
Estimates of the exchange rate pass-through have declined in recent years. The
main explanations for this decline is that expectations of inflation have become
more anchored due to a more stable and predictable monetary policy environment,
supported by the adoption of inflation targeting from several monetary authorities
around the world.
This paper has employed state-space models to estimate the time-varying ex-
change rate pass-through for a large sample of countries. Moreover, by using PSM
as a method to control for self-selection bias, we analyse to what extent explicit IT
is relevant for the declining ERPT by comparing observations which differ only with
respect to whether the country adopts an inflation targeting framework. We there-
fore overcome a main limitation of the empirical literature that tries to document
the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting. More importantly, we conduct a
detailed analysis of the heterogenous effectiveness of IT in reducing the ERPT.
The main results are as follows. First, monetary policy that incorporates ex-
plicit targets achieve lower exchange rate pass-through than non ITers. This finding
is robust to a wide set of alternative specifications and to self-selection bias. Second,
among the different characteristics of IT, older regimes, adopting a band inflation
target and keeping inflation relatively close to the objective outperform any other
IT regime. Third, IT reduces the ERPT at any level of initial inflation or targeted
inflation rate. Finally, even though monetary policy is delegated to an independent
central bank in an inflation-targeting framework, monetary authorities do not need
to implement a high level of independency to achieve lower ERPT.
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Figure 1: Exchange rate pass through
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Figure 2: Exchange rate pass through (cont.)
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Table 2: Average treatment effect of inflation targeting on ERPT.
PSM Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Baseline PSM, treatment is IT, FF criteria
ATT -0.124* -0.140*** -0.128*** -0.167*** -0.124***
(-1.99) (-2.92) (-3.14) (-4.04) (-2.93)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 415 /1011 415/1011 415/1011 415/1011 415/1011
Alternative PSM:
ATT adding structure -0.157** -0.170*** -0.180*** -0.330*** -0.180***
(-2.25) (-3.14) (-3.95) (-6.73) (-4.06)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 415 /799 415/799 415/799 415/799 415/799
ATT adding finance -0.158* -0.174*** -0.184*** -0.214*** -0.180***
(-1.92) (-2.80) (-3.46) (-3.26) (-3.41)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 415 /981 415/981 415/981 415/981 415/981
ATT adding fiscal -0.153** -0.196*** -0.173*** -0.209*** -0.172***
(-2.01) (-3.18) (-3.51) (-3.24) (-3.14)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 415 /914 415/914 415/914 415/914 415/914
Alternative IT criteria: Soft IT
ATT -0.166*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.164*** -0.128***
(-3.01) (-2.63) (-3.03) (-4.12) (-3.26)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 436 / 1011 436 / 1011 436 / 1011 436 / 1011 436 / 1011
Alternative IT criteria: Flawed IT
ATT -0.115** -0.150*** -0.163*** -0.194*** -0.164***
(-2.18) (-3.47) (-4.25) (-4.79) (-3.94)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 343/973 343/973 343/973 343/973 343/973
Alternative outcome variable: long term ERPT
ATT -0.211** -0.248*** -0.267*** -0.269*** -0.268***
(-2.08) (-2.82) (-3.29) (-3.46) (-3.46)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 304 / 919 304 / 919 304 / 919 304 / 919 304 / 919
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and controls).
When ERPT is higher for the controls than the treated, observed coefficient shows a negative value,
(2) t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped (using 500 iterations),
(3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1%. A high t-value indicates a significant gap
between treated and controls, (4) N. Treated/N. Obs. is the number of treated observations over
the sample size.
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Table 3: Impact of inflation targeting on ERPT. Average treatment (ATT)
effect on the treated countries. Level of inflation
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Treatment= targeting when inflation is less than 3%
ATT -0.137** -0.109** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.093***
(-2.24) (-2.17) (-2.76) (-2.75) (-2.73)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 180 / 832 180 / 832 180 / 832 180 / 832 180 / 832
Treatment= targeting when inflation is less than 5%
ATT -0.123** -0.147*** -0.138*** -0.172*** -0.135***
(-2.08) (-3.21) (-3.51) (-3.31) (-3.40)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 270 / 922 270 / 922 270 / 922 270 / 922 270 / 922
Treatment= targeting when inflation is less than 10%
ATT -0.104* -0.124** -0.125*** -0.164*** -0.123***
(-1.87) (-2.52) (-2.91) (-3.58) (-3.05)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 340 / 992 340 / 992 340 / 992 340 / 992 340 / 992
Treatment= targeting when inflation is less than 15%
ATT -0.189*** -0.139*** -0.128*** -0.165*** -0.127***
(-3.35) (-2.81) (-2.95) (-3.81) (-3.09)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 346 / 998 346 / 998 346 / 998 346 / 998 346 / 998
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and controls).
When ERPT is higher for the controls than the treated, observed coefficient shows a negative value,
(2) Standard errors are bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the
10, 5 and 1%. A low p-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls. (4) N.
Treated/N. Obs.is the number of treated observations over the sample size.
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Table 4: Impact of inflation targeting on ERPT. Average treatment (ATT)
effect on the treated countries. Targeted inflation level
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Treatment= target at most 2% of inflation
ATT -0.223*** -0.194*** -0.156*** -0.177*** -0.154***
(-3.55) (-3.17) (-3.98) (-4.55) (-4.07)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 98 / 773 98 / 773 98 / 773 98 / 773 98 / 773
Treatment= target at most 4% of inflation
ATT -0.130** -0.140** -0.102** -0.119*** -0.1000**
(-2.09) (-2.53) (-2.56) (-2.91) (-2.39)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 261 / 936 261 / 936 261 / 936 261 / 936 261 / 936
Treatment= target at most 6% of inflation
ATT -0.0713 -0.118*** -0.129*** -0.156*** -0.129***
(-1.22) (-2.59) (-3.22) (-4.11) (-2.93)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 314 / 989 314 / 989 314 / 989 314 / 989 314 / 989
Treatment= target at most 8% of inflation
ATT -0.107* -0.127** -0.124*** -0.153*** -0.121***
(-1.83) (-2.48) (-2.88) (-3.64) (-2.86)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 321 / 996 321 / 996 321 / 996 321 / 996 321 / 996
Treatment= target at least 2.5% of inflation
ATT -0.184* -0.133* -0.116* -0.120** -0.115
(-1.84) (-1.75) (-1.79) (-1.99) (-1.60)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 152 / 785 152 / 785 152 / 785 152 / 785 152 / 785
Treatment= target at least 4% of inflation
ATT -0.206 -0.235** -0.239** -0.243** -0.230**
(-1.44) (-2.06) (-2.25) (-2.27) (-2.19)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 73 / 720 73 / 720 73 / 720 63 / 720 63 / 720
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and controls).
When ERPT is higher for the controls than the treated, observed coefficient shows a negative value,
(2) Standard errors are bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the
10, 5 and 1%. A low p-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls. (4) N.
Treated/N. Obs.is the number of treated observations over the sample size
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Table 5: Impact of inflation targeting on ERPT. Average treatment (ATT)
effect on the treated countries. Measure of credibility
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Treatment= inflation at objective
ATT -0.257*** -0.247*** -0.252*** -0.262*** -0.251***
(-3.62) (-4.18) (-5.06) (-5.46) (-5.28)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 157 / 832 157 / 832 157 / 832 157 / 832 157 / 832
Treatment= inflation at objective +/- 1pp
ATT -0.295*** -0.216*** -0.217*** -0.234*** -0.219***
(-5.00) (-4.35) (-4.79) (-5.77) (-4.74)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 244 / 919 244 / 919 244 / 919 244 / 919 244 / 919
Treatment= inflation at objective +/- 2pp
ATT -0.190*** -0.182*** -0.145*** -0.169*** -0.144***
(-2.88) (-3.47) (-3.43) (-4.19) (-3.33)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 297 /972 297 /972 297 /972 297 /972 297 /972
Treatment= inflation at objective +/- 3pp
ATT -0.101* -0.150*** -0.131*** -0.157*** -0.129***
(-1.72) (-2.98) (-3.11) (-3.74) (-3.05)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 310 / 985 310 / 985 310 / 985 310 / 985 310 / 985
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and controls).
When ERPT is higher for the controls than the treated, observed coefficient shows a negative value,
(2) Standard errors are bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the
10, 5 and 1%. A low p-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls. (4) N.
Treated/N. Obs.is the number of treated observations over the sample size, (5) pp = percentage
point, measured relative to the point target or centre of the target band. Inflation is assumed to be
“at objective” if the observed inflation rate is within the target band or within a +/- 0.25 pp band
around the point target.
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Table 6: Impact of fully fledge inflation targeting on ERPT. Average treat-
ment (ATT) effect on the treated countries. Duration of regime
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Treatment = country will adopt IT in less than three years
ATT 0.195* 0.133 0.106 0.106 0.107
(1.77) (1.56) (1.42) (1.36) (1.38)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 89/1011 89/1011 89/1011 89/1011 89/1011
Treatment = country has adopted IT for less than 3 years
ATT -0.118 -0.113 -0.055 -0.077 -0.052
(-1.28) (-1.05) (-0.84) (-1.14) (-0.77)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 71 / 723 71 / 723 71 / 723 71 / 723 71 / 723
Treatment = country has adopted IT for at least 3 years
ATT -0.135* -0.139** -0.158*** -0.211*** -0.161***
(-1.80) (-2.24) (-2.99) (-4.40) (-2.97)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 288 / 940 288 / 940 288 / 940 288 / 940 288 / 940
Treatment = country has adopted IT at least for 5 years
ATT -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.217*** -0.256*** -0.214***
(-2.59) (-2.91) (-3.37) (-5.22) (-3.27)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 240 / 892 240 / 892 240 / 892 240 / 892 240 / 892
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and controls).
When ERPT is higher for the controls than the treated, observed coefficient shows a negative value,
(2) Standard errors are bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the
10, 5 and 1%. A low p-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls. (4) N.
Treated/N. Obs.is the number of treated observations over the sample size.
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Table 7: Impact of inflation targeting on ERPT. Average treatment (ATT)
effect on the treated countries. Central bank independence
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Treatment = IT with independence lower than median, Garriga Index
ATT -0.249*** -0.235*** -0.264*** -0.305*** -0.263***
(-3.22) (-3.98) (-4.94) (-5.95) (-4.94)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 152 / 809 152 / 809 152 / 809 152 / 809 152 / 809
Treatment = IT with independence lower than median, Crowe & Meade Index
ATT -0.145** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.230*** -0.215***
(-2.02) (-3.92) (-4.36) (-4.99) (-4.19)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 169 / 826 169 / 826 169 / 826 169 / 826 169 / 826
Treatment = IT with independence lower than median, Bodea & Hicks Index
ATT -0.216** -0.190** -0.211*** -0.254*** -0.209***
(-2.33) (-2.50) (-3.41) (-4.68) (-3.58)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 160 / 817 160 / 817 160 / 817 160 / 817 160 / 817
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and controls).
When ERPT is higher for the controls than the treated, observed coefficient shows a negative value,
(2) Standard errors are bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the
10, 5 and 1%. A low p-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls. (4) N.
Treated/N. Obs.is the number of treated observations over the sample size.
Table 8: Impact of inflation targeting on ERPT. Average treatment (ATT)
effect on the treated countries. Type of IT objective
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Treatment = strict point target (without tolerance band)
ATT -0.0805 -0.0891 -0.0885* -0.0972** -0.0903*
(-0.84) (-1.36) (-1.83) (-2.01) (-1.84)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 58 / 733 58 / 733 58 / 733 58 / 733 58 / 733
Treatment = not a single target value (either a range or a point with tolerance band )
ATT -0.159** -0.120** -0.110** -0.131*** -0.113**
(-2.16) (-2.12) (-2.37) (-2.87) (-2.37)
N. Treated/N. Obs. 278 / 953 278 / 953 278 / 953 278 / 953 278 / 953
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and controls).
When ERPT is higher for the controls than the treated, observed coefficient shows a negative value,
(2) Standard errors are bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the
10, 5 and 1%. A low p-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls. (4) N.
Treated/N. Obs.is the number of treated observations over the sample size.
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A Variables and definition:
Broad Money: money-to-GDP ratio (Broad money % of GDP)
Source: World Bank (FM.LBL.BMNY.GD.ZS) and IMF IFS (35L..ZK)
Central Bank Independence Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the coun-
try is IT and has indepedence greater than median, according to Bodea and Hicks
(2015), Crowe and Meade (2007) and Garriga (2016b) indices . Source: Author’s
calculations based on Garriga (2016a)
Credit: Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank (fs.ast.prvt.gd.zs)
Debt to GDP: General government gross debt (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank WEO and IMF (GGXWDG.NGDP )
Economic Development: measured by primary sector share of GDP
Source: World Bank (nv.agr.totl.zs)
Energy Dependence: Fuel imports (% of merchandise imports)
Source: World Bank (tm.val.fuel.zs.un)
Exchange Rate Variation (∆e): Quarterly year-to-year difference of the log
nominal effective exchange rate. Domestic currency per unit of foreign currency:
an increase implies a nominal depreciation.
Source: BIS- Bank of International Settlements
Fiscal Deficit: General government net lending/borrowing (gdp%)
Source: World Bank WEO and IMF (GGXCNL.NGDP )
GDP Growth (∆y): Quarterly seasonally adjusted year-to-year difference of the
log GDP in real terms.
Source: IMF- International Financial Statistics
GDP Share: The share of world GDP (domestic current US$ GDP over world
current US$ GDP, %, )
Source: Author’s calculations & World Bank (ny.gdp.mktp.cd)
Income: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international USD)
Source: World Bank (ny.gdp.pcap.pp.kd)
Inflation (∆p): Quarterly seasonally adjusted year-to-year difference of the log
consumer price index.
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Source: IMF- International Financial Statistics
Inflation Targeting: Full Fledged : Dummy variable that takes on the value one
if in a given year the country operates under IT, and zero otherwise. The default
IT variable corresponds to the full-fledge definition: countries that make an explicit
commitment to meet a specified inflation rate or range within a specified time frame,
regularly announce their targets to the public, and have institutional arrangements
to ensure that the central bank is accountable for meeting the target.
Source: Rose (2007), Roger (2009) and Minea and Tapsoba (2014)
Inflation Targeting: Soft Dummy variable that takes on the value one start-
ing in the period in which the country officially announced the adoption of IT (and
for all subsequent years), and zero otherwise. Under soft IT, the inflation target
may coexists with other nominal anchors.
Source: Rose (2007), Roger (2009) and Minea and Tapsoba (2014)
Inflation Targeting: Flawed Dummy variable that takes on the value one if
in a given year the country operates under IT, and zero otherwise. Flawed IT is
based on Full Fledged IT but also assumed the USA, Japan and India adopt IT
since 2012, 2013 and 2016, respectively.
Source: Bundick and Smith (2018), Okimoto (2019) ,Mohan and Ray (2019) and
Ito (2019)
IT Number: Number of countries that have adopted IT at the period t
Source: Author’s calculations
Inflation Volatility: Standard deviation of the annualized montly inflation rates
of years t and t− 1.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the consumer price index provided by the
IMF- International Financial Statistics
Market Development: Financial development measure by market capitalization
of listed domestic companies (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank.
Political Stability: Polity2 index taking values from -10 (very autocratic) to +10
(very democratic) and constructed by subtracting the democracy score from the au-
tocracy score
Source: Polity IV Project (Polity2)
Remittances: ”Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)”
Source: World Bank (bx.trf.pwkr.dt.gd.zs)
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Supply Shocks (∆p∗): Quarterly seasonally adjusted year-to-year difference of
the average OECD producer price index.
Source: IMF- International Financial Statistics
Trade Openness: Log of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
measured as a share of the GDP.
Source: World Bank (ne.trd.gnfs.zs)
B IT data-set composition
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Table 9: IT data-set composition
Country IT Full-Fledge IT Soft IT Flawed
New Zealand 1990 1990 1990
Canada 1992 1991 1991
Chile 2000 1991 1991
Israel 1997 1992 1992
Australia 1995 1993 1993
Finland* 1994 1993 1993
Sweden 1995 1993 1993
United Kingdom 1993 1993 1993
Spain* 1995 1995 1995
Korea Republic 1998 1998 1998
Brazil 1999 1999 1999
Mexico 2001 1999 1999
Poland 1999 1999 1999
Colombia 2000 2000 2000
South Africa 2000 2000 2000
Switzerland 2000 2000 2000
Thailand 2000 2000 2000
Hungary 2002 2001 2001
Norway 2001 2001 2001
Peru 2002 2002 2002
Philippines 2002 2002 2002
Slovak Republic* 2005 2005 2005
Indonesia 2006 2005 2005
Romania 2006 2005 2005
Turkey 2006 2006 2006
United States - - 2012
Japan - - 2013
India - - 2016
Notes: The starting date is the current year of adoption if it took place from January to June, the
following year if it took place form July to December. The ending date is 2016 for all countries but
Finland, Slovak Republic and Spain which adopted the Euro in 1999, 2009 and 1999 respectively.
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C Estimated ERPT coefficients by country
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Table 10: Estimated ERPT coefficients by country
State-space OLS
Argentina 1.16 1.00
Australia 0.11 0.16
Austria 0.01 0.08
Belgium 0.10 0.28
Brazil 0.21 0.33
Canada 0.01 0.01
Chile 0.03 0.00
Colombia 0.07 0.32
Costa Rica 0.03 0.00
Denmark 0.10 0.32
Finland 0.16 0.17
France 0.07 0.22
Germany 0.08 0.25
Greece 0.15 0.89
Hong Kong 0.23 0.23
Hungary 0.44 0.49
India 0.49 0.83
Indonesia 0.08 0.19
Ireland 0.21 0.29
Israel 0.81 0.71
Italy 0.10 0.17
Japan 0.10 0.12
Korea, Rep. 0.06 0.24
Latvia 0.20 0.00
Malaysia 0.05 0.31
Mexico 0.29 0.97
Netherlands 0.17 0.32
New Zealand 0.09 0.42
Norway 0.07 -0.12
Peru 0.11 0.22
Philippines 0.10 0.31
Poland 0.79 2.00
Portugal 0.84 1.08
Romania 2.07 3.80
Russia 1.31 1.58
Singapore 0.10 0.17
Slovak Rep. 0.01 0.60
Slovenia 0.45 1.40
South Africa 0.41 0.43
Spain 0.01 0.18
Sweden 0.14 0.20
Switzerland 0.01 0.19
Thailand 0.04 0.36
Turkey 0.24 1.24
United Kingdom 0.00 0.06
United States 0.32 0.20
Emerging counties 0.37 0.71
Advanced countries 0.13 0.2
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D Conditional independence assumption
Table 11: Conditional independence assumption
Treated Control
Nearest 1 Nearest 5
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor neighbor linear (.05)
Mean Pval
Inflation vol.
Unmatched 0,63 0,85 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04
Matched 0,63 0,59 0,448 0,372 0,41 0,45 0,42
GDP Share
Unmatched 0,14 0,41 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Matched 0,14 0,15 0,567 0,32 0,50 0,57 0,51
Market Dev.
Unmatched 77,27 76,99 969 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97
Matched 77,27 78,96 0,861 0,301 0,40 0,86 0,38
Political stab.
Unmatched 8,83 8,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Matched 8,83 8,71 0,524 0,935 0,62 0,52 0,61
IT number
Unmatched 21,55 13,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Matched 21,55 21,51 0,942 0,84 0,82 0,94 0,83
Trade Openness
Unmatched 4,16 4,25 0,042 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04
Matched 4,16 4,14 0,63 0,225 0,60 0,63 0,63
All variables: average Mean
R&R’s Residual Bias 2.66 1.94 1.98 2.81 2.03
R&R’s Bias Reduction 88.79 89.01 90.11 88.79 90.04
Rubin’s B 9.31 7.14 7.74 9.55 7.81
Rubin’s R 0.65 0.74 0.54 0.71 0.51
In Table 11, the mean is reported only for the Nearest neighbor (1) matching
algorithm, the mean under other algorithms being very close. The difference be-
tween the Unmatched Treated and Unmatched Control is the initial biased, while
the difference between the Matched Treated and Matched Control is minimized dur-
ing the matching process. The absence of sample bias (also known as conditional
independence assumption) is validated by testing the difference between the vari-
able average for the treatment group and the control group. In the absence of bias,
their should be not significant difference between the two groups means, indicated
by a large p-value. An overall evaluation of the conditional independence assump-
tion is given by Rosenbaum and Rubin’s standardised percentage bias, which is the
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average gap between the Treated and Control group expressed as a percentage of
the square root of the sample variance. In our case R&R’s standardised percentage
bias has been reduced by about 90% thanks to the matching process, resulting in
a bias after matching (R&R’s Residual Bias) of about 2%, which is small enough
to accept the absence of Conditional dependence. In addition to the latter statics
relative to the covariate balancing, the PS balancing can also be tested, either in
mean (Rubin’s B) or in variance (Rubin’s R). Rubin’s B is a measure of the average
PS gap between the Treated group and Control groups. As a rule of thumb, the
balancing hypothesis is accepted for values below 25. Last, Rubin’s R is the ratio
the Treated group PS index variance to the Control group PS index variance. The
acceptance threshold is generally assumed to be from 0.5 to 2 and is validated for
our five matching algorithms. R&R’s Bias and Rubin’s B and R are bootstrapped
(using 500 iterations).
41
